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Thie writer need hardly apologize
subject

of CAVEAT 7MPTOR for a tl-hesis
views

fully had his first

in

subject

strengti-ened,

that

choosinfe

the

for *1 e 'has
is/

that

it

was

an important and interesting subject.
it

Arising as
form best adarted
it

was

did in

a cormwrercial

e,.,e,

to 1 romote commercial welfare,
in

extremely strict

its

first

usage

it took

the

and although

it 'has now become

an almost perfect rule, whereby not only the seller but also
the buyer is protected.
It has belen the 1urpose of the writer
a clear and accurate analysis of the law
pages.

For this

in

1urpose he has dividj

to give

theo following
the subject

into several heads, endeavoring thus to make them more
complete.

71ith this

offer my work.

slirht

introduction

I hiesitatingly

CAVRAT EMPTOR.

The meaning of tie maxim caveat eml tor is given
to be,

let

descrirtions.

the buyer beWare,

and aprlied to

wletlher of lands or goods,

urcmhases

of all

as well to t110 title

as to the quantity and quality.
The law requires t1he purcl aser in all cases to use
the utmost diligenc<'in the investigation

of tle right, title

and quality of the thiing to be purchased,

and if

he does not,

then, in the absence of positive fraud on t'he part of the
vendor,
faults.

he must take t]'ie goods as he find-s

them with all

If the buyer wishes to secure himself

against

bein-, imposed upon , ]he can require a warranty and t1 -e article must agree with this warranty.

In view of these

facts, we can formulate the 7eneral rule as follows:

In

the absence of either fraud on the part of the seller or
the buyer not having required a warranty,

Le rule of caveat

emptor u ually ajpilies.L

i.
Morris v. Thompson, 8b Ill.
it_;
Boman v. Olemner,, 00
Indiana 10;
Richardson v. Bauk, 42 Iowa, 185;
Seixas v.
Wood, P Cainnes 48. Hargous v. Stone, j9N.Y. 73;
Parkinson v. Lee, 2 Rasts, 3O;
Hopkins v. Tanquerey, lo
0.-.
30.

The early
and

law

law of Pngland partook of th e civil

the decisions were based upon 1the rule

'ofthat

system,

known as caveat venditor.
1Tnder both systems
of title

on the sale

ponsibility

early

T

-lish

in

regard to the resquality there

law and this

a sound price

was the very

implies a warranty of

the soundness

of the article

the vendor is

not bound to the vendee for the quality or

goodness

of the thing

is

difference.

to the civil

doctrine,

an implied warranty

to answer for, the

irreconcilable
According

is

of chiattels,but

of the seller

a vast and

tIhere

sold.

sold except

Under the present

in

rule,

the case of fraud or

warranty.
The historical

growth of the rule has to me always

seemed the best way to learn the rule at
and with this

point in

view,

early TRnglish cases upon this
subsequent

changes.

the present time

I have endeavored

to

Tired the

subject and to trace their

Also to note the -American decisions

which we will see have not changed so much.
Before

L

1 Dry.

20

the case of Stuart

v.

Wilkins,, decided!

in

1/78,

Qase whlich Ilaces

and t1e earliest

before us,

it

the current

was

ti-e doctrine

olpinion that a sound price

was a warranty of soundnoss.
In this case the most exptreme rule was formulated,

in

the endeavor

doctrine and

to escape from the civil

it even went so far as to set aside implied warranties enmaking the rule,

tirely

that the rraxim would aillly

in

every

case where there was no fraud or an express warranty.
In

case of Chandellor

the

derendant,
bezoar,

it

a goldsmitli,

lesser value.
it

It

was a bezoar,

Lupus,

decided

in

1792,

the

sold a stone which he said was a
a chear

however,

was,

v.

was held

stone of anbother kind of

that

the bare affirmation that

without warranting it

to be such was no

cause of action, and although the seller knew that it was
not a bezoar,

it

was not material.

judge says "Everyone
good,

in

selling

or the horse he sells
In

Parkinson v.

For as the learned

wares will

affirm them to be

to be sound".
L e-# decided1

judges agreed that the rule of caveat

in

1802,

ll

-he

emptor applied to

sales of all kinds of comnodities and that without an express

1.

2 'ast's

320.

warranty by

or fraud,

the seller

the buyer must

stand to

his losses.
The 14nglish

jud

upon these early cases
law,

so as

f'eelin r, as
trine
ves

is

to raise

in

the

to again chan-e

an implied warranty

in

certain cases,

his lecture says# "The

doc-

Thus they took upon themsel-

ufair".

decidedly
it,

look-with disfavor

however,

and endeavore,]

,r. Woodson who

to change

,,

admitting for that purpose some of the

doctrine of the civil law;

this doctrine was that of an im-

plied warranty on the sale of the goods.
In the case of Hilbert v. Shea decided in 1807
and in Gardner v. Gray, 1815 where Lord 7llenborough deci-led
that a sale by sample raised an i rplied warranty that the
bulk equalled the sample.

This case however, was decided

in this manner because the buyer had no opportunity to
inspect the goods, but

it is

sufficient to show us that the

doctrine of implied warranty was being accepted by the
Frnglish courts.

In the case of Okell v. Smith- tin cans

were sold and did riot answer the purpose for which they were
ordered;

it was held that there was an implied warranty that

1.
2.

2 Wood, 415.
4 Camp. 76.

6.

1 Starkie, 86.

for use and further that

they were fit

In

remained at his risk.

a

the implied warranty

Common Pleas

decided that

of trade.

Prown v.

existed in
jones v.

in

and

specific puriose,

usages

or they

notice he was bound to take t~ em away,

the seller

that

the buyer gave

if

a warranty

TdinF'ton,

the

it

was held

sale of rope for
the Th lish

7owden#,

was implied from the

And so I could name innumerable cases

changin7 the early doctrine
cases at the present

in

Tlhe 2-;lish

tngland.

time follow these cases rather than

those w'ich so strictly

enforce

the rule of caveat

emntor,

and it places upon the seller certain restrictions which are
fair and just.
While t 1 le Eng-lish courts have
very strict rule
cases,

yet

Likewise

in

rule requires an express warranzy.

country we find the cases

similar ant to the
warranty which is

from the

-nd have raised an implied warranty in some

th e g-enelal
this

drifted

effect

that

followed in

to be almost

there must be an express
all

states

except

South

Carolina and Louisiana and enforced in Maryland with only

1.
2.

2 Man. and '-ran.
4 Taun. 841.

2/U.

one exception i. e. where inspection is impossible.
In Seixas v.

Wood#,

"In all

Thompson, J. says

cases express warranties must be male"but this was a very
early case &nd should not be taken without
No judge at the preserit

time would say

So Justice Selden says

some modification.

"in all cases".

"Where there

is

neither

fraud nor warranty, and the buyer receives and retards the
goods without

objection,

he waives the right

to object after-

Ordinarily this is the rule in t-is country#.

ward.

We have noticed in the preceding pages that
there is a continual reference to warranty, and that express
warranty is generally required to Fuard against caveat
emptor;

we have likewise endeavored to show that this is

not always the case.
Although express warranty has little

to do with our

subject, we will introduce some slio-t suggestions
to it

as it

may not be without value.

in regard

In the sale of

real property express warr nty is usually given, but

in

1.

Cainnes 48.
C
2.
1 Wall 301.
3.
Dean v. Morey,
33 Iowa, l:O;
Moore v. Mcinay,
471;
Pac. I. W. v. Newell, 34 Conn., 67;
Bernar
10 Wall, 38&.
Welch v. Carter, I Wendell, 185.

v.

5 Cal.,
Iellog

the sale of personialty unless

tie

seller

buyer of tle existence or nonexistence
to the bargain,

actually

the

of a fact pertaining

does riot warrant

the seller

assures

the goods ex-

pressly.
The

intention of t~he party is of tbe greatest im-

portance in these cases and the whole force of tThe bargain
may be chanfged by sT-owing that tlhe intention was
from the action.

It

been uniformly adopted

Iias been said by ]olt

different

J.0.

'"T'at an af.Jirmation at the

and has
time of

sale is a warranty if it apy-ears to have been so intended".
Warranties are interpreted like oti-er contracts,
but one point that Lseems

of great

importance is that a mere

expression of opinion can never be construed as a warranty,
and as most cases arise under this misconception,

T will

cite ihe leading ones in a note#.
Often in the absence of express warranties the law
raises a presumption in favor of the buyer, and upon these
presumptions rests the law of implied warranties which will
occupy our attention during the remaining pages.

1.
Thompson v. McNight, 75 Ili. 89;
Hankins v. Pemberton,
51 N.Y. 198;
Weiner v. Clement, 61 Penn state 117.

into two j arts;

Tmplied warranties are lividel
Second,

implied warranty of title;

First,

of the goods sold.

as to quality

,The early fnvlish rule

lid not recognize any im-

the rule of caveat emptor applied.

plied warranty of title,

"The mere act of selling

Coke says

irnrlied warranty

aaron Parke

the responsibility of triving a gool title".
finds that

with it

does not brin

in

may be accounted for on the ground that

this

older days the question of title did not enter into mens
minds or

intentions because the sales were cormonly made

obtained by the buyer was

in market overt where the title

good against all save the soverei7n.
The doctrine
M-orley v.
ker in

is

Attenborough# where

selling wares

the case of

fully sustained in
it

was held

T3oes not warrant

"That F pawnbroin

the title

absence

of express warranty".
The doctrine does no longer exist
America, and it
warranties

in

in

'England

or

is now settled that there are implied

the

sale of p-dersonal -royerty,

but the au-

thoritics are still unsettled as to what facts must exist

1.
2.

Coke Lit. 102.
2 Ex. 500.

in order that sucli a warranty can be implied.
Benjamin, in his work on Sales,
doctrine settled in the following cases:

considers tho
in an

First,

executory contract of sale, the vendor, by implication,
warrants his title

in the goods;

Secondly, if 'he affirms

that the chatiels are his own, he warrants the title.
And no implied warranty can arise First, where the vendor
expressly refuses

to assert his own title.

The cases are

all agreed on this proposition and hold that the vendor's
position to the goods is i nconsistent with an inference
of t i tle-#.
And in regard to judicial sales,

it is held that

the doctrine of warranty of title never exists and that
caveat emptor always ail lie"
Our courts

,ave held in some row cases that an

implied warranty exists in every case where the

to disclose the effects of th e title, but

seller fails

this seemingly is

too harsh a rule and the general rule in t}is country as well
as in 7nfrland is that whzen the seller has actual or potential
possession of the goods,

that there is an implied

Maxey, 15 Ill.--;
Hicks v. Skinner, 71
.C. 5,59;
2.
McManus v. Keath, 49 Tll. 388;
McGuire v. Faber, 'r-2
Penn. state 436.
1.

Pu--v.

w,-IL
war~ranty-I"

These decisions arise out of tre presumption
"every seller
is

undertakes

his own"';-.
IJicholz

thatlthe commodity which
v.

Bannister settles

7nrland and arOTAts the following
chattel
unless

"That

implies an affirmation by
the seller

ho sells

the rule

one on, the

not to assert ownership, but simply

in

sal,, of a

tlie vendor that it

shows by evidence that his

th-at

is

his,

intention was

o dispose of his inter-

est".
Special attention is to be paid to the fact that
it

is not

required of the selier to have actual possession

of the goods.

All that

is

be obtained when necessary.

required

is

that possession

A warranty of title may be

on princil:le implied from any unequivocal act of ownership;
when one undertakes to sell goods, he asserts his dominion
over the proyerty and exercises tlhe power of an absolute owner
for no one else but the true owner can
except

7ive a

-ood

title,

in the f,.w cases noted before, therefore the reason-

1.
Peoples Pank v.
Hanks, 2, Wis. 74;
Wallach v. -Tree, 104
2.
Blackstone Com.

Yuatz, 99 Penn. state,
344;
Carlylev.
MAorris v. Thompson, 85 Ill.
16;
Mass. 4 ;
451.

able presumption is,

that one who undertakes to sell fKoods

without saying anything to the contrary, is the owner and
is selling hs own goods.

And this warranty of title

extends even to bonds, stocks and to other incorporeal personalty '.

The general rule so far as the quality of the artile sold is concerned is cav,,at emptor;

there being no

warranty of quality unless one is expressly demanded or
given.

This is followed in all states save South Carolina

and Louisiana, and has been spoken of in a different connection.

flenjamin says in his admirable work on Sales

"The rule in such cases is caveat emptor, by which is
meant that when the buyer, has no warranty he takes the

quality upon himself".
In Vesy v. Dayton# Metcalf' J. says:

"The plaintiff

has not to rely upon the representation of value as facts,
or to place any confidence in it.

Such representation,

however exaggerated, false and deceptive, is not actionable,
if the subject be open to inspection, he is bound to examine

1.

99 Penn. State.

2.

Benjamin on Sales Chap. 840

3.

3 Allen 380.

for himself or take a warranty."
In Penninger v. Thomrson-# tie suit was for the
price of a horse, and the detferise concealing that the horse
was diseased.

Ogden J. says:

"It

cannot be concealed that

K got a great advantare in trade and put upon r, a defective
and windbroken horse, yet the question arises whether a'
legal defense was established.

No warranty appears to

have been given and none can be inferred.

This is the

rule in England# and in the United States#-.
This rule is simply the outcome of the rule by the
courts of not interfering in matters where by personal vigilance and due exercise of care a person could protect himself.
In no case do the courts aid a person for the lack of care
in
but

his own behalf,
in

the

idea being

to fosier

self-reliance;

a case where fraud has been perpetrated

hand to aid in

with a ready

replacing the wrong.

The rule of caveat) emptor also applies where the

/

person has inspectod the goods carelessly as the courts

1.
2.

24 Albany Law Journal, 257.
Jones v. just,
L.R. 3 Q.T.
197;
Hopkins v. Tanqueray,
10 C. T.
20;
Vent, 478.
Bowman v. Cleeves, ;'0
ind. 10;
Pichardson v. Bond, 4, Iowa
l8o;
Day v. Pool, 52 N.Y. 416;
Kimberg v. Taylor, 29 aine,
.308;

will not the person to

take advantage of his own carelessness

and some authorities even refuse to relax

he rule when a

buyer has special confidenue in the seller's honesty.
Such as in a case where t

ere was a false reresentation as

to ihe market value by a seller who knows to a, purchaser
who does not.

The purchaser had confidence in these state-

ments, but the court held, that as the article was one of
general commerce and no particular knowledge was necessary
to ascertain the price, that if one party wished to act
under such circumstances, he cannot thereafter repudiate
the contract.

This seems to be very poor law and has few

adherents, for if we are not allowed to place confidence ii
persons whom we trust our social and business life would soon
be rotten with meanness and deceit.
As the courts look to justice in most cases, they
have applied the doctrine of caveat eMptor upon the buyer

after he has had ample or-.Iortunity to inspect the goods and
thus been

.laced in a position to find any defects, which

existed, and it is no more than just that if he has not been
placed in this position it is no more then just to imply a
warranty in his favor.

Some courts hold that

the goods

i'urchased under

such

circumstances

shouldI be mecr.antable#.

The foregoing propOsition as to the rule of a3Iplying caveat

emptor are subject

to certain exceptions,

and we

will now consider these.
exception to

T!,e first

in

the g,;eneral

rule is

the case where goods are bourht by samrle.
is

So .'reat

the use Of samrie in

manner,

thus

simplifyingr it

usual manner of carrying

greatly.

rools

the sale of

that all large mercantile houses carry on tl cir
tis

found

business

in

Such being the

on these transactions,

t!ere

must

of course be some 1Irovisions made which will giv'; to the
thus the courts have provided,

buyer some security,

that is

a sale by sample there is always an implied warranty that the
bulk will equal the
Thornpson it

is

an implied warranty that the bulk of the goods so deliv-

11ansen v.
equals

1.
2.
3.

said:

Tn Bradley

v.

ered shall

is

sample in quality#.

"Where goods are sold by sample there

correspond with the sam] le exhibited#,.
Burke

the sample

n implied warranty exists
exhibited.

10 Wallace, 388;
22 Texas 270.
4;5 Ill.

499.

49 Ill. 275.

In

th at tl-e bulk

These cases are
for it

followed in

all

thie states,

is plainly to be seen if such were not the rule, the

sale by sample would have no meaning, and it appeears

to me

to be nothing more t"an the doctrine that the seller must

deliver that which he has agreed to sell.

The identity

of the goods seems to be the essence of the contract, and
when the goods sold do not agree with the sample there seems
to be no performance of the contract.
The burden of proof in such cases is upon the vendor to prove that the bulk was equal to the sample.
In Penn. however, tilere

is no implied warranty fhat

ti,,e $',oods sold by sample are equal to the sample in quality
and likewise that there is no implied war-anty against
latent defects which

exist in the goods and which appear in

the eami le.

however,

Tliis,

is

the rule

in most states-;.

In case the bulk does not agree .withthe sarmple,
the vendee of course need not take, the goods, and has a
reasonable time to come to a decision.

1.
2.

Boyd v. Wilson, 83 Penn. State 619.
62 Conn. 146.

In

a case; in

2 Barh an

I have forgotten we find the

Adolf the name of which
"If

following-:

not receiviri

in

justified

them,

do

is

the vendeO

not agree with the sample when deliered,
not merely

the groods

but Tie may re-

ceive and examine, and if found to be wantinfg in quality or
description,

he may return it

to tlie vendor

in

a reasonable

time.
It is held in Illinois not only that the goods may
be rejected,

but if

the vendee accerts he may recover the

difference in value, between the samrle and the goods sent#.
In

Fngland,

they are delivered
return them;

the goods are sold by sample and

and accepted by the purchaser he cannot

but if he does not completely accept them,

if he has taken the delivery conditionally, he has

that is,
a right

if

to -ive

them a

fair

anr

trial,

if

they are found not
In

to correspond with the sample he may return them.
Scotland.

so that

1.

it

he can return them at any

if

they do not agree,

It

will be seen that th-is is
will be necessary

65 Ill. 512;

at first

79 Ill. 131.

an important

time

subject

to find out just

what

constitutes a sale by sample for if it

is not by samijle no

implied warranty will exist.
The mere showing of the sample
make the sale one by sample.

does not necessarily

The mere exhibition of a

sample on a sale amounts only to a representation that the
I

sample ha6 been taken from the bulk of the

commorlity of-

fered for sale.
In

1ar rous v.

Stone# it

is

said by Paige J.

:

"Rvery exhibition of a sample does not per se make the
sale by sample.

There must be an agreement to sell by sam-

ple or at least an understanding' that the sale is to be by
sample" .
The opportunity to inspect the goods is an important element

in

terlded to make it
opportunity

determining w1etler or not
a sale by sample.

the parties

in-

Tf the buyer has no

to inspect the goods and a sample

is

exhibited

at sale and offered him for examination, the courts would
presume that it was a sale by sample and would recognize a
warranty

1.
2.

of correspondence

of the sample with the goods.#

o N.Y. V. ' Atwater v. Clancy, IO
ass. 369.
2 Tiedemanl8-Day v. Raquet, 14 Minn. 282

a person

Suppose
bes

havinr

,oods,

the

an implied

is

tT-e

be

goods will

equal

made.

was

sale

the

uion which

to the descrirtion

such cases

In

that

contract

the

with Ttim,

samle

sample no

no

descri-

and simply

store

simply by description.

buyer purchasing
there

a

enters

Ordinarily the courts will not hold a mere descripTion

to a

to amouant

If

definite terms.

sold under

such as

app-ear under

next

Our at-Gention will
cases

what

and implied warrant

in

the

chandiso

in

the

First,
p-rovisions
warranty

qecond,

family.

for

thlat
T-e

C0gul-r
'

en,

family
tiley are
cases

in

are

where

a

use,

r
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th,
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this point and the

ciple of paublic I olicy.

-ire probabLy !)ased] on the prin-

For it is

the public as re-arls tl-eir heaith,
will always

fo

the advant,-,e of

and unpiincipied

dealers

take every I ossible advantag,.) that th-ey can

ret

over the buyer.
Mr. Story

says:

"That

as to the

sale of provis-

ions for immediate domestic use and consumption,
warranty

s3uch

a

(sreakin7 of' implied warranty) is necessary for the

preservation and life#.
So in thie case of Babcock v. Tyleir,

it was held

that when corn was sold for family use th-ere was an implied
warranty that it waE wholesome

nut there seems to be

another 1:.hase to sucl" cases, and the courts have given much
weig ht to thle position of the seller in such sales; presuming tlat a vendor of an article of food from th e nature
of his calling knows whet'her they are wholesome or not.
Thus much misconception arises between tle action of deceitt
and implied warranty.

1
TToover

2

Story on Sales, 6/6.

v. Peter--,

16

Norehouso v. Cemstock,

,ich. ol.
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to the
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as oT.-er articles of commerce and unles
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s

person can insist t}hat thle goods be of a larTicular fineness
unless h e h as a warranty, but teat tl-ey are merchantable
should be Veld".

In tlie case of selling spool silk,

Lord 71lenborouli

considered the law settled that without

any particular warranty, there is an implied warranty that

the goods are salable.

Tut this implied merchantability

is limited, only ,for so long as they are in the seller ' l.
possession and in order' that a warranty exist for any
length of time arter they leave the seller's control and
during transit an express warranty should be

,,iven-.

In the case of 7oods ordered and supplied for

particular purpose, there is it ai- ears an implied warranty
that they are reasonably

fit and Irorer for the 2 urpose for
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where a thing is
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ordered for

a special purpose, not applied to those where a special thing
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intended to be used for a special
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facturer and

law rests upon the trust placed in the rnanuin his skill in his particular branc-_ an.- by

implying a warranty tTey simply enforce a rule that a man
oun'ht

to be fit to do the work

,-at 'he contracts

pecially if' it requires particular skill.
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.Jones v. Boyle I Stark, 384.
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P. (. I. Oompany v. Groves 08 Penn State 149.
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